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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview and characterisation of the rejection of the European 
Constitutional Treaty by a majority of voters in France’s referendum held on 29 May 2005. Whilst pointing to 
the salience of political discontent with the incumbent right-wing government and some elements of the 
longstanding crisis in French national party politics, the analysis places the emphasis on the central role played 
by social issues in the referendum, the transposition at the European level of the mechanism of the evaluation by 
voters of traditional parties’ performances and responsiveness to the country’s social malaise and the unilateral 
termination by a majority of left-wing voters of the social welfare and economic growth confidence pact that 
they had made with their national political elites on the occasion of the Maastricht referendum in 1992; 
 
 
 
Introduction 
On 29 May 2005, French voters decisively rejected the European Constitutional Treaty by a 
large majority of 54.7 per cent of the votes in the third referendum on Europe since 1972 and 
the Yes vote on enlargement and the accession of the United Kingdom to the European 
community. Not only did this outcome come in sharp contrast with the result of the 1992 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty won with a narrow 51.05 per cent of the vote and the 
pro-EU majority that still exists in the French public 1, but it did also plunge both the country 
and the EU in a deep and unprecedented institutional and political crisis while raising the 
issue of the constitution’s demise and paving the way for other member states to vote against 
the constitution or avoid, as in the British case for instance, a potentially politically damaging 
referendum in countries marked with Euroscepticism. Indeed, the Dutch referendum which 
was held on 1st June 2005 led to a resounding and even more emphatic rejection of the 
European charter with 61.6 per cent of the vote possibly delivering a final blow to the Treaty. 
 
The announcement by President Jacques Chirac in July 2004 of the forthcoming referendum 
led to the opening of a bitter public debate nationwide and fierce opposition between those 
favouring the ECT and those rejecting it. The 69.3 per cent turn-out in the May referendum 
bore testimony to the exceptionally high level of public interest in the campaign and brought 
increased significance to the final decision by France’s voters. The outcome itself came as no 
surprise as most voting intention polls had forecast a No vote as early as mid-March 2005 
despite a short period of optimism in the beginning of May rekindling hope of a last-minute 
swing in public opinion. All companies taken together, surveys published in the last fortnight 
                                                 
1
 While rejecting the European charter at the polls, nearly three-quarters (72 per cent) of the voters said they were in favour 
of the process European integration (IPSOS). Eurobarometer data regularly point to the high level of support to the European 
Union in the general population in France and the public perception of the benefits of France’s EU membership. 
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before voting day were still giving a picture broadly in line with the final result with figures 
between 51 and 55 per cent against the Treaty in a remarkably consistent series of polls. 
Despite the many efforts and calls by EU-officials, national and European leaders of the Yes, 
the contribution by the ‘undecideds’ did not significantly alter the balance of forces between 
the two camps. Nor did the personal interventions by President Chirac on three occasions 
during the campaign suffice to curb the rising tide of opposition to the European 
Constitution 2. 
 
Political dissatisfaction with the incumbent right-wing Government and President Chirac was 
regarded by many commentators as a key explanation to the vote on the ECT, particularly in 
the light of the high level of mobilisation on the left side of the political spectrum and the 
clear indication that a majority of the traditional left-wing electorate had voted against the 
Treaty. The public debate on the need for a ‘fresh impetus’ in national politics, which 
immediately followed the speech by President Chirac on the night of the vote, and the 
consequent appointment of Dominique de Villepin as Prime Minister, resulted in the outcome 
being considered as no more than yet another expression of public discontent with the ever 
more unpopular policies implemented by Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s Government, and somehow 
reduced the impact of the French vote on the overall process of ratification throughout the EU 
to being mere collateral damage. Following this assumption, the referendum would fit into the 
same logics of a ‘second-order’ election as did, for instance, the five sets of European 
elections that have taken place in France since 1984 which were all fought over national ‘first-
order’ issues. 
 
Although hardly questionable, the strong domestic element in the May 2005 political vote in 
France must be first complemented with the analysis of the development of anti-
Establishment attitudes in the public and the rise of anti-system parties on the margins of the 
political system since the late 80’s. The April 2002 political earthquake whereby extreme 
right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen reached the second round of the presidential ballot and 
mainstream parties of both the Left and the Right obtained strict minimum electoral support, 
was a clear indication of the widening gap between ruling political leaders and the citizens. 
 
Yet, the sole ‘protest’ or ‘dissent’ vote hypothesis would undoubtedly fail to satisfactorily 
account for the profound nature and exceptional magnitude of this new tremor in French 
politics, as would also the analysis of the outcome in terms of a simple xenophobic cautious 
retreat in national sovereignty and isolationism. In many respects, the rejection of the ECT in 
2005 was first and foremost a retrospective vote on the process of European integration itself, 
and the unilateral termination by a majority of voters of the social welfare and economic 
growth confidence pact that they had made with their national political elites on the occasion 
of the Maastricht Treaty referendum in 1992. Whilst the latter clearly opposed anti-system 
Euro-sceptics to mainstream Euro-enthusiasts (and pragmatic converts) of the Left and the 
Right, the novelty of the 2005 contest was the critical view of the EU model of social and 
economic governance in a wide segment of those, and more particularly left-wing voters of 
the middle class, who had subscribed to the alternative utopian European project defended by 
President François Mitterrand thirteen years earlier. 
 
                                                 
2
 Unlike President François Mitterrand in 1992, President Chirac never took the risk of debating with a leader of the No. His 
first appearance on television on 14 April 2005 took the form of a debate with a panel of about 80 young voters aged under 
30, which was highly criticised on both content and form, as was the interview given by the President to professional 
journalists on 2 May. The last and solemn speech on 26 May 2005 was the final attempt at convincing last-minute voters of 
the need for supporting the European Charter at the polls. 
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I. ‘Second-order’ model and tactical party manoeuvring 
 
The particular salience of domestic issues and a number of key elements of national concern 
help assess the relevance of the conceptual framework of the second-order model offered by 
Reif and Schmitt in the early 80’s (Reif & Schmitt, 1980) for European election results to the 
analysis of the outcome of the 2005 referendum in France. The timing of the latter within the 
national election cycle was that of a mid-term election three years after the last general 
election and two years ahead of the next presidential ballot in 2007. The impact of the 
national political agenda and the many concerns about the socioeconomic situation on the 
people’s choice was manifest from the referendum campaign and final results. 
 
Without any doubt, the election was greatly influenced by the exceptionally high levels of 
unpopularity of both the Prime Minister and President following a steady downward trend that 
started in early 2003. A week before polling day, government popularity reached its lowest 
point ever since 2002 with only 39 and 21 per cent of positive ratings for Jacques Chirac and 
Jean-Pierre Raffarin respectively (BVA-L’Express survey, 20 May 2005) as opposed to 60 per 
cent for both of them in January 2003. Discontent with the incumbent government had been 
already strongly expressed in the 2004 regional and European elections where right-wing 
UMP suffered great electoral losses. In March 2004, the lists put forward by the socialist party 
and its allies received 50.3 per cent of the vote in the second round of the regional election 
and gained presidency over 21 out of the 22 regional councils in metropolitan France 
(compared with 8 in 1998). Center-left parties won a total of 1,126 seats of regional 
councilors as opposed to only 522 in the moderate right (36.8 per cent of the vote). The April 
2004 cabinet reshuffle and the strong emphasis put by the renewed government on social 
justice issues proved to be highly ineffective and was hardly regarded by voters as an 
appropriate response to their concerns by President Chirac. The UMP faced another electoral 
debacle in the June European elections by winning a mere 16.6 per cent of the valid vote cast 
against 28.9 per cent for the lists put forward by the socialist party which on that occasion 
achieved its best score ever in European ballots. The whole period of the referendum 
campaign was also characterised by the high level of pessimism in French public opinion and 
the many concerns expressed by voters with regard to an anticipated deterioration of the 
national economy. 
 
The traditional plebiscitary nature of referenda in France since De Gaulle’s stepping down 
from Presidency in the wake of his defeat in the 1969 ballot, as well as the personal 
involvement by President Chirac in negotiating the ECT and proposing its ratification to 
popular vote, were clear incentives for voters to seize the opportunity to send yet another 
message of discontent to the current head of State. This potential instrumental counter-
plebiscitary effect was reinforced by the profound trauma caused in a vast majority of left-
wing voters by the very specific set-up in the second round of the 2002 presidential ballot that 
opposed President Chirac to populist far right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen: on that occasion, the 
socialist and communist electorates were invited by party leaders to “save the French 
Republic” and resign themselves to voting ‘against nature’ in favour of the moderate right-
wing candidate who consequently polled a spectacular 82.2 per cent of the vote. To a certain 
extent, the post-21 April 2002 syndrome might have contributed to a number of left-wing 
voters rejecting the European Treaty on the ground that the referendum was closely identified 
with the personality of Jacques Chirac himself –if not his brainchild– and that a positive 
outcome would inevitably lead to the President’s personal situation being reinforced within 
the national political game and his reputation restored at international level. 
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The strategic dimension and interference by individual agendas and personal rivalries were 
clearly not absent from the campaign as was demonstrated by all the tactical manoeuvring that 
took place on both sides of the political spectrum, in most cases with the 2007 presidential 
contest in mind. The fierce antagonism and personality-based competition between President 
Jacques Chirac and popular UMP leader Nicolas Sarkozy over the right camp at least partially 
clouded the European issue and limited the amount of public support brought by the latter to 
the former. The ‘challenger’ undoubtedly benefited from the political weakening of the 
incumbent President after the Treaty was rejected by the whole electorate whilst accepted 
simultaneously by a vast majority of UMP voters under his leadership. Sarkozy who was keen 
on supporting the European project would also ostensibly promote a radical shift in 
government policies in order to meet the growing expectations of the public. Similarly, it was 
obvious to all that the anticipated victory of the No camp would definitely sound the death 
knell for the Prime Minister whose mandate had been prolonged by President Chirac in spite 
of severe electoral setbacks and an abyssal decline in popularity. 
 
Similar features were noticeable on the left side of French politics, particularly within the PS 
which went into a phase of increased intra-party factionalism and discord during the 
campaign. Socialist MP and former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius managed to establish 
himself as a key leader of the left-wing No campaign in overt opposition to the official stance 
taken by the PS following the December 2004 vote by party members which gave a 
substantial majority of 58.8 per cent in favour of supporting the European constitutional 
Treaty. In opposing party leader François Hollande as well as all national spokesmen, 
historical figures (Jacques Delors, Robert Badinter, Michel Rocard, Pierre Mauroy) and 
fellow members of pro-Yes Rasmussen’s Party of European Socialists (PES), Fabius’ aim was 
to outline the need for re-thinking the party’s social-liberal approach to the economy and 
social issues at both national and European levels. It was also clear that such a strategy was in 
part meant to assert his personal influence within the party national leadership as potential 
runner for 2007 in spite of bitter internal party strife, the many ad hominem attacks against 
him and fierce hostility by socialist leaders of the Yes, more particularly the front row anti-
Fabius troika made up of Martine Aubry, Jack Lang and Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Despite 
his formal retirement from national politics, former socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin –a 
long-standing rival of Fabius– took part in the PS official campaign on a couple of occasions 
by making influential speeches in the national media in favour of supporting the European 
constitution, which most certainly spread rumours about a possible return to politics as post-
election surveys revealed that a majority of PS voters would support his candidacy to the 2007 
presidential election. 
 
Alongside this, the referendum momentum re-activated some of the internal fights between 
rival groups among top-level party elites that had taken place over the definition of PS 
ideology and the need for tactical alliances with its left wing at the Dijon party congress in 
May 2003. The No campaign by a number of prominent national socialist leaders built upon 
the existing factions united under the banner of the ‘Local Committees for a socialist No to 
the European Constitution’, which fought to promote a more leftist project as a response to 
the electoral earthquake of 21 April 2002 and the desertion from the socialist electorate of a 
growing proportion of working class voters disillusioned with the five-year experience of 
Jospin’s ‘plural left’ in office between 1997 and 2002. Key proactive figures of the ‘socialist 
no’ to the European constitution, Senator and leader of the “Social Republic” think-tank Jean-
Luc Mélenchon or MP Henri Emmanuelli had significantly failed to dislodge the tactical 
alliance built around Hollande’s personality and leadership back in 2003. In Dijon, the radical 
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wing of the PS embodied notably by Emmanuelli and Mélenchon’s ‘New World’ and Vincent 
Peillon, Arnaud Montebourg, Benoît Hamon and Julien Dray’s ‘New Socialist Party (NPS)’ 
groups won a respective 16.3 and 16.9 per cent of the national congress vote whilst François 
Hollande had his motion passed with a comfortable majority of 61.4 per cent. In 2005, the 
joint campaign organised by the socialist defectors together with leaders of the LCR 
Trotskyites, the Communist Party, dissident members of the Green party and the many 
representatives of various radical anti-globalisation organisations, was clearly an attempt by 
the representatives of the archaic wing of the socialist party at altering the existing balance of 
power within the PS national apparatus and a call for the unification of the whole of the 
French left without debarment. 
 
 
II. The political crisis in France 
 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which all the above elements –most of which would be 
appropriate to the first-order arena of French politics– did effectively affect electoral 
behaviour and the people’s choice in the May 2005 referendum. Arguably, the concept of 
‘expressive’ or ‘insincere’ voting as defined by the traditional ‘second-order’ model as voters 
choosing to vote with their hearts rather than their heads would fail to account entirely for the 
electoral processes that took place on that occasion. In particular, the very high level of 
popular participation in the referendum would invalidate the general hypothesis that turnout is 
expected to be lower in second-order elections (Mattila, 2003): the participation rate of 
69.3 per cent in the referendum on the European constitution was very similar to that of the 
1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty (69.7 per cent) and just below that of the first 
round of the 2002 presidential election (71.6 per cent), the first-order election of reference in 
the French political system. In contrast, turn-out in the June 2004 election in France was only 
42.8 per cent (in sharp decline since the first European ballot in 1979 where turn-out reached 
60.7 per cent) (Lodge, 2005) 3. 
 
The above data on political participation wouldn’t support the classic ‘salience’ argument that 
somehow there was less at stake in the referendum as compared, for instance, to the 2002 
general election. Nor would the actual results support the assumption that the incumbent party 
should suffer important electoral losses due to voters’ retrospective judgements of the 
government’s record (Kousser, 2004): according to pollsters, UMP and UDF supporters voted 
massively in favour of the European constitution with 80 and 76 per cent of Yes votes 
respectively (IPSOS Exit-poll survey, 29 May 2005). When prompted to state their motives 
for voting against the Treaty in an open-ended question, only 18 per cent of the naysayers did 
quote their “opposition to the incumbent government and President Chirac”, such motive 
ranking fourth in the list of most frequently cited reasons for rejection by all supporters of the 
No, as well as amongst left-wing voters (Flash Eurobarometer 171, 30/31 May 2005). 
 
From a systemic perspective, a relevant explanation of the French vote in the 2005 
referendum lies with the profound crisis of legitimacy faced by all governing parties of the 
left and the right, the development of deeply rooted anti-Establishment attitudes in the 
electorate as well as the rise and subsequent institutionalisation of new opposition actors on 
the extreme fringes of the political spectrum. The vote on the European constitution can be 
considered an aftershock of the April 2002 political earthquake and the centrifugal electoral 
dynamics of French politics. The constituent elements of such a disaffection towards politics, 
                                                 
3
 Interestingly, the outcome of the Dutch referendum on the European charter showed a similar pattern with an overall turn-
out rate of 62.8 per cent far above that of the last European elections in June 2004 (39 per cent). 
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the decline in traditional partisanship and increase in party fragmentation, and the weakening 
of representative democracy in France have been well documented by research (Cole, 2003; 
Elgie, 2000; Grunberg, Mayer & Sniderman, 2002; Hanley, 1999; Perrineau, 2003). 
Diminishing legitimacy of party politics and mistrust of the electorate for their political elites 
were patent in the 2002 presidential ballot which confirmed the sharp decline in support for 
all mainstream parties and the widening gap between ruling political leaders and the citizens: 
while the parties of the traditional “bipolar quadrille” secured about 90 per cent of the vote in 
the late 70s, their share was down to only 46.3 per cent of the total vote on 21 April 2002 
(Jaffré, 2004). Over the past decade, this fundamental inadequacy of political supply has also 
been revealed in the form of growing rates of abstention in first-order elections (Bréchon, 
2003), increased levels of electoral volatility, the ‘proportionalisation’ of electoral choice 
under the majoritarian ballot system (Parodi, 1997) and the development of parties outside the 
mainstream (Cautrès & Mayer, 2004; Lewis-Beck, 2000 & 2004; Perrineau & Ysmal, 2003). 
 
In 2005, the space for electoral competition was deeply structured by the anti-system 
dimension which overlapped almost entirely on that particular occasion with the cleavage that 
developped over the acceptance or rejection of the European constitutional Treaty. Within the 
Yes camp, the referendum campaign clearly showed that, despite bitter party disputes over 
Europe in the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, the parties of moderate left and right 
had completed their long process of conversion to the European integration project and 
ideological shift towards a predominantly Europhile position. 
 
This was particularly true in the UMP which showed a very high level of party discipline and 
loyalty to President Chirac’s posture on the ratification issue that contrasted with the 
Eurosceptic stance of the RPR in the early years (Haegel, 2002). In the Gaullist movement, 
the most significant split over Europe took place in 1992 with the ‘internal’ dissidence from 
national leaders Charles Pasqua and Philippe Seguin in the Rassemblement pour le non au 
référendum following their aborted coup at the national congress of the party in Le Bourget in 
January 1990. In October 1998, the party’s Convention on Europe completed the ideological 
‘normalisation’ of the Gaullist movement in support of the personal involvement of President 
Chirac. The vote in March 1999 by an overwhelming majority of 81.9 per cent of the RPR 
parliamentary party (113 out of 138 members) in favour of ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty 
led to the departure of Charles Pasqua who subsequently combined forces with Philippe De 
Villiers’ Mouvement pour les Valeurs in the June European elections where their joint list for 
“Rassemblement pour la France et l'Indépendance de l'Europe (RPFIE) came ahead of that 
put forward by the RPR by polling 13 per cent of the vote and winning 13 seats in the 
European Parliament. In June 2001, no less than 87 per cent (121) of the 139 Gaullist MPs 
approved the ratification of the Nice Treaty, a very similar proportion to that of 90.9 per cent 
achieved among the 362 members of the UMP group in February 2005 for the revision of the 
French constitution preliminary to the ratification of the new European charter. This was 
followed by the passing by the national council of the UMP in March of Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
motion with 90.8 per cent of the vote in support of the European constitutional Treaty while 
simultaneously refusing the accession of Turkey to the EU-membership against Chirac’s 
personal view. This strong commitment by the vast majority of the UMP parliamentary group 
members and the involvement of most Ministers placed the President’s party in a leading 
position in the public debate over the ratification. Within the party, the opposition to the 
Treaty was supported by a minority faction of Eurosceptics under the banner of the “New 
Gaullists” led by Deputy and President of think-tank “Stand up Republic!” Nicolas Dupont-
Aignan, Senator Philippe Marini or Deputy Jacques Myard, President of the “Nation and 
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Republic” (CNR) political club with the support of Georges Pompidou’s former Prime 
Minister Pierre Messmer, leader of the “Presence and Gaullist action” association.  
 
Rid of the anti-Maastricht contestation by Philippe De Villiers in 1992, the traditionally pro-
EU and federalist UDF came as much needed reinforcement of the UMP in the Yes 
campaign 4 despite recurrent criticism by François Bayrou of Government national policies 
since 2002. Whilst highly critical of the Nice Treaty in 2001, the UDF parliamentary group 
voted massively in favour of the constitutional revision (28 out of 31 members, that is 
90.3 per cent) and, through force of circumstance, found itself a major ally of rival UMP 
joining forces with the Chiraquiens on a couple of occasions in national meetings. 
Paradoxically, neither the UDF historical profound attachment to European ideals nor the 
crucial contribution by former President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in drafting the European 
Treaty helped the party assert itself as a leader in the campaign for the constitution. Despite 
the gathering of a special “Convention on Europe” on 21 May 2005 and an impressive record 
of public meetings in the two months that preceded polling day, the impact of François 
Bayrou as promoter of the Yes was largely undermined by public opinion with polls placing 
the UDF president behind UMP leader Nicolas Sarkozy or President Jacques Chirac as 
perceived ‘best spokesman” for the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
On the left side of the political spectrum, the official position adopted by the Socialist Party in 
the 2005 campaign remained broadly in line with the pro-EU stance by the PS inherited from 
the Mitterrand’s era. In 1992, the campaign for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty led to 
the dissidence of Jacobin Eurosceptic Jean-Pierre Chevènement who subsequently formed the 
Mouvement des Citoyens and left the party in 1993. Despite the ambivalence of some Socialist 
leaders –among which Lionel Jospin himself– towards the monetary union, the PS maintained 
a fairly clear position on Europe in the wake of the narrow victory of the Yes in 1992 (Bell, 
1998). Under the auspices of the Jospin Government, the PS parliamentary party voted 
massively in favour of both the Amsterdam (213 out of 250, 85.2 per cent) and Nice Treaty 
(232 out of 254 votes, 91.3 per cent) in 1999 and 2001. In contrast, the vote over the 
constitutional revision prior to the ratification of the European charter in February 2005 
showed a manifest decline in the PS support for the project with 90 out 149 votes (60.4 per 
cent) in favour of the revision and a total of 56 abstentions among which were found future 
leaders of the No vote such as Henri Emmanuelli or Laurent Fabius. 
 
The No constituency brought together a fairly heterogeneous collection of minor fringe and/or 
radical anti-system parties placed disparately on the traditional left-right axis, providing 
further illustration of the heterogeneity of the ideological space for Euroscepticism in the 
French electorate (Evans, 2000). Indisputably, conservative MPF leader Philippe De Villiers 
played a prominent part in leading the ‘national sovereignty’ camp into combat, getting a new 
lease of life after the electoral setbacks that his party had suffered in the 2002 legislative 
elections and, to a certain extent, in the 2004 European ballot. De Villiers proved particularly 
successful in cunningly –and improperly– articulating the European constitution issue with 
those of immigration and the accession of Turkey to the Union. Simultaneously, the anti-
Establishment component of the message sent to voters was evident in the public speeches by 
the MPF leader. In comparison, controversial RPF leader, and President of the UEN (Union 
for Europe of the Nations) group in the Strasbourg Parliament, Charles Pasqua, weakened by 
previous allegations of political corruption and recent accusation of receiving favours from 
Saddam Hussein's regime under the UN's oil-for-food programme for Iraq, made a distant 
                                                 
4
 In the 2005 campaign, the only contestation from within the UDF was that of conservative deputy Christine Boutin’s Forum 
des Républicains Sociaux and UDF representative Jean-Christophe Lagarde. 
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contribution to the campaign for the No vote by stressing the Gaullist heritage in the right-
wing position against the Treaty. Similarly, the FN opted for a discreet campaign although 
some of the key issues discussed in the public debate over Europe were clearly proprietary 
issues of the extreme-right on which Le Pen’s party could potentially capitalise electorally. 
Partly a consequence of continuing party factionalism and the internal dispute over the issue 
of Le Pen’s succession, this strategic choice by the FN leadership was also prompted by their 
analysis that, given the strong rejection of the party by a majority of the French public, to 
associate the party too closely with the No vote would be very likely to lessen the electoral 
appeal of the vote against the European constitutional Treaty. It was assumed on the other 
hand that the FN would in any case benefit a posteriori more or less directly from the victory 
of the No camp. The campaign themes proved to be very consistent with those developed in 
the 1992 Maastricht referendum and the long-standing Europhobic nationalist component of 
the FN’s ideological corpus (Evans & Ivaldi, 2005). Not surprisingly, these themes were 
echoed by rival yet politically marginalised Bruno Mégret’s MNR which remained however 
largely absent from the media during the whole campaign period. As did also Jean Saint-
Josse’s single-issue party Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions (CPNT) whose timid call for 
rejecting the Treaty was hardly audible, mainly as a consequence of the party’s decline  
following its mediocre performance in the 2004 European election with 1.7 per cent of the 
votes (as opposed to 6.8 per cent in 1999). 
 
Although an important architect of the leftist No vote in 1992, Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s 
Mouvement Répiblicain et Citoyen (MRC) has since failed to enter the arena of national 
politics and establish itself as a serious contender to the other players of both the left and the 
right. In 2005, the party had serious difficulties in making itself heard within the left camp 
and was almost inexistent in the public debate where the task of promoting the vote against 
the Treaty was taken over by the more or less formal alliance between the LCR, the PCF and 
rebel Socialist leaders. In particular, popular young spokesman and former presidential 
candidate for the LCR Olivier Besancenot played a prominent part in the No campaign of the 
left with the backing of a number of radical organisations and representatives of trade unions 
under the banner of the Copernicus Foundation and the Appel des 200. Other parties of the 
extreme left such as the Worker’s Party (Parti des travailleurs) or Arlette Laguiller’s Lutte 
ouvrière (LO) largely stayed in the background in spite of their fierce opposition to the 
European Treaty. Enthroned the new ‘Madonna’ of the No vote by the press and the media, 
communist leader Marie-George Buffet was given the opportunity to play a central role in the 
campaign along the lines of the ‘Euroconstructive’ yet critical stance initiated back in 1994 by 
the Bouge l’Europe list put forward in the European election. Faced with endemic electoral 
decline and in constant search for ideological identity between protest and incumbency 
(Courtois & Lazar, 1995; Lavabre & Platone, 2003), the PC found itself a linchpin of the 
broad tactical alliance of the left. Once a member of the governing coalition with the socialists 
(Szarka, 1999), the PC clearly distinguished itself from its former dominant partner and 
seemed to move further away from the pro-system posture to regain some political strength 
through supporting the No vote in the 2005 referendum. 
 
Overall, the opposition between governing parties and minor peripheral forces was central to 
the vote. A glance at the structure of electoral choice according to party preference reveals the 
significance and polarisation of attitudes along that particular line of cleavage: of the extreme 
left and PC supporters, 94 and 98 per cent voted against the European constitution 
respectively; similarly 75 per cent of the MPF voters and 93 per cent of the FN supporters 
rejected the Treaty, as did 79 per cent of those who had cast their vote in favour of CPNT 
leader Jean Saint-Josse in the first round of the 2002 presidential election (IPSOS). This 
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underlying anti-Establishment dimension of the public expression in the referendum is of 
crucial importance as it reflects the lack of public legitimacy of the European project itself in 
France, which from the start has been regarded essentially as an ‘elite-driven’ project with 
little popular knowledge of European issues and overall a trend for the European integration 
process to be mediated in most cases by political parties. The rich literature on democracy, 
legitimacy and European integration has long pointed to the need for better informing 
European citizens in order to persuade them of the value of supranational governance and to 
increase the overall political legitimacy of European integration (Blondel et al., 1998; 
Banchoff & Smith, 1999; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996). To 
some extent, the 2005 referendum campaign opened a space for public expression and 
information about the Constitutional Treaty, of which French citizens had been noticeably 
deprived since the 1992 debate on the Maastricht Treaty despite major forward moves such as 
the change over to the Euro or the accession to the EU by a significant number of Eastern 
European countries. 
 
In sociological terms, there was strong empirical evidence of the impact of the occupational 
element on the propensity for voters to reject the European Treaty at the polls with a clear-cut 
class cleavage opposing the haves and the have-nots in contemporary French society. This 
pattern of class voting on European issues had already been emphasised in the 1992 
referendum on Maastricht, yet the gap between upper and lower status citizens seemed to 
further widen in the 2005 ballot. On the latter occasion, nearly two thirds (65 per cent) of the 
professionals, executives, businessmen and managers supported the European charter whereas 
67 and 79 per cent of the less skilled routine non-manual and working class voters 
respectively cast a decisive No vote in the referendum. In comparison, 53 per cent of the 
former and 61 per cent of the latter had voted against the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The 
appeal of the No vote was particularly striking in the economically disadvantaged and those at 
the lower end of the economic ladder as demonstrated by the 71 per cent score achieved in the 
unemployed in 2005 compared with 59 per cent in the 1992 referendum (IPSOS). The 
opposition between those in the lower social strata and better-off voters was further revealed 
in the geographical spread of the No and Yes votes. The rejection of the Treaty reached peaks 
of over 60 per cent in the depressed post-industrial areas of northern France: 69.5 per cent in 
Pas-de-Calais, 66.8 per cent in Somme, 66.7 per cent in Aisne or 61.9 per cent in Nord. In the 
blue-collar city of Calais, the No received up to 74.4 per cent of the votes. In contrast, urban 
upper class voters in Paris provided a strong support to the European Charter with a total 
66.5 per cent of Yes votes. Interestingly, in spite of the overall majority support to the Treaty 
in the capital city, there were significant differences across districts, with approximately 
80 per cent in favour of the Yes in the predominantly bourgeois and upper class areas (6, 7, 8 
and 16th) as opposed to less than 60 per cent in the working class –and relatively more 
socially deprived– arrondissements of East-Paris (18, 19 and 20th). 
 
 
III. Voting on Europe: the end of an alternative utopia? 
 
A clear message to the unpopular incumbent right-wing government as well as the expression 
of mistrust of discredited political and intellectual elites by those once referred to as “la 
France d’en-bas” by Former Primer Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, yet the vote in the May 
referendum in France cannot be restricted to just being another expression of popular 
discontent, be it of an even greater magnitude and international impact than the electoral 
landslide of April 2002. The people’s choice to reject the European charter was also based on 
the European dimension per se and, within that particular dimension, a twofold phenomenon. 
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First, one shouldn’t undermine the contribution to the overall total of the No vote by the 
Eurosceptic xenophobic withdrawal embodied by right-wing conservative MPF or the 
extreme-right. Undoubtedly, the national sovereignty camp regained momentum during the 
whole time of the campaign and eventually took a significant part in delivering the fatal sword 
thrust to the European constitutional Treaty. From available exit-poll surveys results, one can 
estimate that the right-wing Eurosceptic vote accounted for approximately 45 per cent of all 
the nearly 15-and-a-half million No votes in the referendum (CSA Exit-poll survey, 29 May 
2005), the FN supporters representing about a third of all those who chose to reject the 
European charter (Louis-Harris Exit-poll survey, Libération, 30 May 2005). As mentioned 
above, the publicisation and rather crude manipulation by MPF leader Philippe de Villiers of 
the highly controversial issues surrounding possible future accession by Turkey to the Union 
–which the vast majority of French voters systematically oppose in opinion polls– acted as a 
powerful tool for electoral mobilisation and appeal to the xenophobic segment of the national 
electorate. Indeed, the issue was not totally absent from the voters’ mind on polling day: 
according to the various surveys published after the referendum, Turkey’s candidacy to the 
EU was quoted as a salient issue and a key motive for rejecting the Treaty by 14 to 35 per 
cent of all voters: in the IPSOS exit-poll, the accession of Turkey to the Union came as the 
first reason for voting against the European constitution in both the UMP and FN/MNR 
supporters (quoted by 56 per cent of both electorates, with no specific account of MPF voters) 
(IPSOS). 
 
In that, the vote in the 2005 election did partly resemble that of the 1992 referendum on 
Maastricht which had been fought over the issue of France’s sovereignty, further European 
pillar integration and the heterogeneous fears of loss of national identity (McLaren, 2004) to 
which the acceleration in the move towards supra-nationalism gave rise 5. Like in 1992, the 
traditional petty-bourgeois clientele of the national sovereignty right strongly opposed the 
European Treaty: 58 per cent of the self-employed cast a No vote in May 2005 (compared 
with 56 per cent in the Maastricht referendum) (IPSOS). Particularly striking was the 
rejection of the European charter in the rural areas and amongst France’s 650,000 farmers –
70 per cent of the latter voted against the ECT whereas 62 per cent had rejected the Maastricht 
Treaty (IPSOS)– despite the European CAP being notably disproportionately favourable to 
French agriculture. This apparent paradox ties up with preceding remarks concerning the 
salience of a class-based structure of electoral choice in the 2005 referendum: anti-EU 
feelings have become widespread in small-scale units against the perceived urge for 
increasing productivity and growth in intensive farming at supranational level, and what is 
described as an unequal share of the CAP subsidies favouring intensive farming in the largest 
units over smaller ones. The embarrassment of the most prominent farmers’ union (FNSEA) 
was evident in Jean-Michel Lemétayer’s decision not to give any indication to members as 
how to vote in the referendum (national congress of 23 March 2005). Grassroots peasant 
militancy embodied by the Confédération paysanne and its former spokesman, popular leader 
José Bové, took an anti-ECT stance consistent with the general anti-globalisation line 
defended by the organisation, which brought the CP closer to the anti-liberal free-market 
positions of the leftist opposition to the Treaty. 
 
In 2005, indeed, the most significant element in the rejection of the European constitution was 
the retrospective performance evaluation vote on the EU model of social and economic 
governance and the re-interpretation at the European level of salient domestic issues based on 
                                                 
5
 Linear bivariate correlation between the No vote in 1992 and 2005 was 0.747 at p<.001 in the 96 departments of 
metropolitan France. 
 11 
the traditional left-right axis of competition. Macroeconomic and social issues – such as 
unemployment, the risk of social dumping, public services, competition with the new member 
States and more generally fears about globalisation– were clearly central to the referendum 
campaign. The high level of pessimism in French public opinion, the general public 
perception of a prolonged economic recession and the widespread lack of faith in the 
government’s ability to resolve the intractable problem of unemployment were fuelled by the 
country’s actual economic circumstance. After a period of stabilisation during 2004, 
unemployment had risen again in 2005 to reach 10.2 per cent in March, approaching the 
2.5 million symbolic threshold. In April, the European Commission released a forecast for a 
slowdown in France’s GDP growth to 2 per cent in 2005 against the more optimistic 
anticipation of 2.5 per cent by the French Government. In February, industrial production fell 
0.5 percentage point after a period of stagnation in January. 
 
The social and economic malaise was palpable since 2003 and was eventually revealed in the 
massive strikes and walkouts taking place across the country, with tens of thousands gathering 
in Paris for protest marches in March 2005. Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s government had to face one 
of the largest trade union mobilisation since his appointment in Matignon, which brought 
together a wide range of corporatist interests –rail workers, post-offices, gas and electricity 
workers, civil servants, school teachers, hospital emergency unit staff, public scientific 
research, fishermen, technicians in public radio broadcasting– over the defence of the public 
sector, the claim for higher wages and a fierce opposition against the government’s move to 
amend Martine Aubry’s Bill on the 35-hour working week. The many opinion polls published 
during the time of the referendum public debate pointed to pessimism and boiling social 
discontent. The Eurobarometer survey that was conducted in the Fall of 2004 showed a 
gloomy perception of the general economic conditions by a significant proportion of the 
French population with 47 per cent anticipating an increase in the national unemployment rate 
and another 43 per cent feeling that France’s economic situation would get worse over the 
next 12 months (Eub. 62.0, TNS Opinion & Social, Oct.-Nov.2004). In March 2005, more 
than a half (56 per cent) of the French felt that “their purchase power had decreased over the 
past three years” (CSA-L’Humanité-La Nouvelle Vie ouvrière, 30/31 March 2005). The 
National Statistics Institute (INSEE) reported that the Household Confidence Indicator (CVS) 
had slumped in May giving a reading of minus 29 points on the adjusted basis (as opposed to 
minus 24 a month earlier) after a long period of deterioration from September 2004 associated 
with persisting doubts about the government policies’ efficiency to address the issue of 
unemployment. 
 
Social and economic issues clearly dominated the referendum campaign by political actors in 
both the Yes and No camps, with particular emphasis on the perceived neo-liberal, pro-market 
nature of the text itself and endless debates over the ‘best’ social system applicable to Europe. 
The ideological polarisation over the European Commission’s Directive on Services in the 
Internal Market referred to as the ‘Bolkestein Directive’, or discussion over necessary 
amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact were symptomatic of how the actual debate 
over the social European model took shape during the referendum campaign in France. The 
space for political and electoral competition was structured by the traditional left-right axis of 
conflict (Bartolini, 1984; Evans 2003) thereby demonstrating the increasing overlap between 
domestic and European areas. Indeed, the reference made by most competitors to the 
opposition between the so-called ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘French’ social models during the whole 
period of the referendum campaign did reappear in the controversy over the ‘new impulsion’ 
in government policies following rejection of the Treaty by voters. Such defence of the 
French social system against the alleged economic liberal ideology embodied by the European 
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constitutional Treaty was a key element in the electoral propaganda by parties of the extreme 
left or the PC with expressly working-and lower-class appeals, opposing Europe as a pure 
capitalist construct that would open French workers to the perils of free-market liberalism and 
globalisation, and demanding treaty renegotiation. Absent from public meetings, PS rebel 
leader Laurent Fabius clearly lent his support –and brought mainstream credibility– in the 
media to such campaigning themes with a strong emphasis on social rather than economic 
factors. 
 
The salience of social issues was further demonstrated in the attempt by the rightist nationalist 
camp to grab hold of the many concerns expressed by voters in the 2004 regional and 
European elections. Although not new to the extreme right ideology (Ivaldi 2003 & 2005), the 
FN’s referendum campaign aimed to increase the party’s seductiveness to working-class 
voters by stressing the destructive impact of the neo-liberal ideology underlying the whole 
European integration process. For instance, Le Pen’s party denounced the “extreme liberal 
and free-trade dogma of the European Constitution which would aggravate the economic and 
social catastrophe that is affecting the majority of French people” (FN national convention, 
Strasbourg, 9 April 2005). More surprising was the allegiance by the once neo-liberal 
harbinger MPF conservative leader Philippe de Villiers to rejecting “free-trade globalisation”: 
“if the Yes wins, said de Villiers, we will have the D-plan: relocation of industry 
(délocalisation), deregulation (dérégulation) and a breaking wave of immigrants (déferlante 
migratoire)” (Meeting in Palais des Sports, Paris, 21 May 2005). In contrast, the referendum 
outcome demonstrated the incapacity by left-wing leaders of the Yes to convince their 
electorate that the European Constitution was, to quote PS Euro-enthusiast Jack Lang, “ a 
rampart and a shield to protect us from US and Chinese economic mammoths” and the best 
“weapon against the destructive and hostile ultra-liberal capitalist ideology” (PS meeting, 
Marseille, 31 March 2005). 
 
On the electoral ‘demand’ side, the salience of social and economic issues was revealed in all 
post-referendum opinion polls. Over half (52 per cent) of French voters said they had 
expressed their “discontent with the current economic and social situation in France” whilst 
another 40 per cent had voted against the Treaty on the grounds that “the constitution was too 
economically liberal” (IPSOS). For 46 per cent of the voters, “the Treaty would aggravate 
unemployment in France” and was “too liberal” for another 34 per cent (SOFRES). Fifty-
three percent of those interviewed by CSA expressed their “worries” about the social impact 
of European integration. Looking at the specific reasons given by the naysayers to account for 
their vote, the “negative effects of the European Constitution on the employment situation in 
France”, the “level of unemployment and weakness of the economy” and the “too liberal free-
market nature of the draft” were cited as the first three motives for rejection the Treaty (Flash 
Eurobarometer 171, 30/31 May 2005). The age structure of the No vote was clearly one 
opposing those in the working categories of age to the elderly or those in retirement: all age 
groups under 60 rejected the Treaty whereas support to the European charter was only found 
in those aged 60 and over. 
 
The left-wing electorate’s contribution to France’s refusal of the European charter emerged as 
a key feature, accounting for an estimated 57 per cent of the total No vote including 8 and 
49 per cent for the extreme and mainstream left respectively (CSA). Unlike PS party members 
who had massively supported François Hollande’s stance in favour of the Constitution in 
December 2004, the majority of PS supporters followed Laurent Fabius’ line of 
argumentation and rejected the Treaty in the polls: in 2005, 56 per cent of the socialist 
electorate cast a No vote whilst no less than 78 per cent had voted in favour of the Maastricht 
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Treaty in 1992 (IPSOS). A similar pattern was observable in the Green party’s supporters 
with over 60 per cent of the ecologists voting against the Treaty as shown in the various exit-
poll surveys. At party level, these results reflected the ambivalence of the national leadership 
of the Green movement and their timid support of the European Constitution: whilst most top-
level party elites called for a Yes vote (including national secretary Yann Wehrling, MEP 
Alain Lipietz and Jean-Luc Bennahmias, Deputy Noël Mamère, Senator and former 
Environment Minister Dominique Voynet and Paris deputy-Mayor Denis Baupin) with the 
help of MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a mere 52.9 per cent of the 8,800 members of the 
traditionally Europhile Green party had voted in favour of supporting the Treaty in February 
2005 6. 
 
Similarly, a breakdown of the vote by trade union identification revealed that 78 and 75 of the 
CGT and FO supporters respectively had cast a No vote in the referendum whereas the 
majority of CFDT, CFTC and CGC-CFE voters had supported the European Treaty (57, 65 
and 85 per cent respectively) (IPSOS). Overall, the unions came highly divided to the 
referendum campaign. In the CGT, national leader Bernard Thibault was disowned by the 
motion against the ECT passed by the majority of the National Co-federal Committee (CCN) 
in February 2005 (74 against out of 166 members). Although fairly critical of the ‘economic 
logics’ behind the European constitution, Forces ouvrière secretary-general Jean-Claude 
Mailly distanced himself from the pro-Treaty position of John Monks’ European Trade Union 
Confederation (TUC) whilst simultaneously refusing to call for the No vote. In the Yes camp, 
François Chérèque’s CFDT did on the contrary join with the TUC in supporting the European 
constitution following the national bureau of 24 September 2005, yet did not instruct 
members how to vote in the referendum. As did the CFTC or the CFE-CGC. The former had 
passed a motion in favour of the economic and social chapter of the European Constitution in 
December 2004. CFE-CGC President Jean-Luc Cazettes had expressed his personal doubts 
about the constitution and fears about the risk of social dumping with the foreseeable return of 
the Bolkestein directive in the case of a Yes victory. Only the French business organisation 
(MEDEF) supported unambiguously the vote in favour of the Treaty thereby expressing the 
traditionally pro-EU element in French corporate culture. 
 
The majority rejection of the Treaty by the left-wing electorate corresponded also to a 
significant shift in the sociological support for Europe : whilst they had massively voted in 
favour of the Maastricht Treaty, middle-class voters did –for a noteworthy proportion of 
them– swing over towards opposing the European constitution. In 1992, 62 per cent of the 
mid-level management white collars had voted the ratification of Maastricht; in 2005, over 
half (53 per cent) rejected the European Treaty (IPSOS). According to other surveys, the 
proportion of routine non-manual in middle-management positions casting a No vote was 
between 56 and 66 per cent (SOFRES and LHF exit-polls respectively). In the ‘employees’ 
(junior white-collar positions), the CSA institute reported a 66 per cent No vote in the 
referendum. 
 
As discussed earlier, political discontent with the incumbent right-wing government is a 
possible –although a reductionist– characterisation of the electoral swing in the traditionally 
pro-EU left-wing voters of the middle-class in the 2005 referendum. Arguably the referendum 
outcome needs also to be assessed in terms of the performance evaluation vote on the process 
                                                 
6
 The ambivalence of the Green party towards the European integration process was evident in their opposition to ratifying 
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 and call for a dramatic change in the rules of the game at the European level. In 2005, like 
their socialist allies, the Greens had to face internal dissidence from regional Councillor Francine Bavay and Paris Deputy 
Martine Billard over social issues in the European Constitution. 
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of European integration itself and the reappraisal by voters of the alternative utopian project 
that was originally defended by pro-Maastricht elites –and more particularly former President 
François Mitterrand– in 1992. In order to understand the motive for such disenchantment with 
Europe, one needs to introduce here some elements pertaining to the peculiar relationship that 
was established between French voters and the European project. We would suggest that, in 
some respect, the ideal of supranational integration was resorted to by most political elites in 
France as an alternative utopian project for mass-mobilisation in view of the ruling parties’ 
perceived inefficiency to counter the devastating social effects of economic recession. In 
March 1983, the ideological shift by Pierre Mauroy’s socialist government towards drastic 
austerity policies together with the decision to keep France inside the EMS led not only to the 
PS abandoning its utopian vision of the world, with all the well-known political and electoral 
consequences at national level (Bergougnioux & Grunberg, 1992), but also to the European 
project being identified for the first time in France with a system of supranational constraints 
weighting on the country’s control over its own future rather than a political locus for 
international co-operation where France’s national interests would flourish. 
 
In 1992, the campaign over the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was an attempt to alter 
such a widespread public perception of Europe as an iron collar, and a clear invitation to pass 
a vote of confidence in the future benefits of France’s membership. More fundamentally, it 
was the opportunity for French citizens to seal a confidence pact on social welfare and 
economic growth with their national elites whereby the European integration project was 
regarded as a credible alternative political utopia to discredited and inadequate domestic 
socio-economic policies of both the left and the right following successive alternations in 
power in 1981, 1986 and 1988. Europe was then conceived as a means of compensating for 
the lack of responsiveness by dominant parties and, somehow, a solution to France’s 
economic recession and intractable problem of unemployment. The notion of ‘European 
social model’ was a key element in President François Mitterrand’s conception of Europe and 
was central to his commitment to obtaining the inclusion of a social chapter to the Maastricht 
Treaty. The official speech by then Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy before the French 
Deputies on the opening day of the parliamentary session on constitutional amendments prior 
to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on 5 May 1992 contained all the elements of the 
proposed alternative pact on Europe: the project for further European integration was 
described as a driving force behind ‘social progress’, ‘an advanced social model’ and “a space 
for the protection of workers’ social rights and the insertion of those excluded from economic 
growth”. A rampart against economic and social ‘laisser-faire’, Bérégovoy’s conception of 
Europe was also raising ‘hopes of economic growth, more jobs and an increase in purchasing 
power”. 
 
In May 2005, the majority of voters –among whom figured a significant proportion of the left-
wing electorate– put a decisive and abrupt end to such an utopian European project. They 
seized the opportunity of the referendum on the ECT to express their grievances and terminate 
unilaterally the confidence pact they had made with their national leaders thirteen years 
earlier. The critical assessment of the European model of social and economic governance 
was a key element in the referendum: unlike the public debate over the Maastricht Treaty 
which was mostly about the ‘EU to be’ and therefore prospective in essence, the ECT 
campaign proved more complex in that the retrospective evaluation of the post-Maastricht 
European social system did interfere with the projective dimension inherent in the 
Constitutional Treaty, notably with regard to the most necessary institutional changes within 
the enlarged Union. As Europe became more present in people’s everyday life –particularly 
since the tangible change over to the Euro in 2002– so did the overlap between the domestic 
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and European arenas become more apparent and, as a consequence, the propensity for voters 
to transpose at the European level the mechanism of voting on the assessment of national 
parties’ socioeconomic performances, which has been evident at the national level from all 
major elections and subsequent alternations in power, each election since 1981 going against 
the incumbent government. What was at stake in the 2005 referendum in France was the 
popular perception of the apparent European Union’s inability to secure and deliver the so 
long promised public goods at supranational level, and satisfy the citizens’ fundamental need 
for protection against the many threats posed to the stability and permanence of the French 
social model by economic globalisation. The general perception of Europe was again one of a 
specific system of constraints imposed on France through the Stability and Growth Pact, the 
monetary union or directives issued by the Brussels Commission, if not simply one of Europe 
as the benevolent ally of the evil forces of free-market liberalism, contested and considered 
responsible for the economic and social crisis in France. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
At party level, the referendum proved particularly damaging to President Chirac and the 
socialist party. The personal failure of the former over the European issue clearly undermined 
his credibility at both national and international levels. Together with the perception of 
President Chirac by other EU leaders as the unwitting ‘burier’ of the European Treaty, the 
electoral setback of May 2005 will indisputably cast a shadow over his ability to enter the 
2007 presidential competition and solicit a third mandate from French voters. On the left, the 
PS is now facing the perspective of a difficult party congress in Le Mans in November 2005 
after the ousting of Laurent Fabius and a number of his followers (including Claude 
Bartolone, Henri Weber or Alain Claeys) from the PS national leadership on 4 June 2005, and 
the growing pressure put on the party’s top-level instances by the minority groups that 
successfully advocated for the rejection of the European charter. Strategic issues concerning 
the opportunity for building a left-wing pole were under discussion since the failure of 
Jospin’s candidacy in the 2002 presidential election (Boy, 2003). Despite however internal 
party dispute and the temporary tactical co-operation of all anti-ECT forces of the left, a broad 
alliance that would embrace all supporters of the leftist No vote in the referendum remains 
very unlikely. The real issue for the PS is now clearly one of leadership together with the 
preparation of a credible alternative to the incumbent right in anticipation of the 2007 
presidential election in order to successfully appeal to socialists voters in both the No and Yes 
camps. 
 
Undoubtedly, one major issue will be whether or not the reshuffling of the party system that 
took place over the referendum issue will subsist and significantly impact on the domestic 
political arena in the 2007 national elections. Although constantly present in voters’ mind and 
a structuring dimension of the attitudinal and ideological space in French politics, Europe 
never really emerged as a salient issue per se in first-order elections in France (Belot & 
Cautrès, 2004). The Maastricht naysayers of both the left and the right never managed to 
occupy the realm of national electoral competition and have so far remained largely marginal 
to the core party system, as was demonstrated for instance by the failure of Villiers’ MPF or 
Chevènement’s MDC to weigh significantly on the outcome of the 1995, 1997 and 2002 
elections in spite of notable performances in the 1994 or 1999 European contests. Given their 
intrinsic anti-Establishment element and because they encompass a wider range of social 
issues beside the sole European dimension, parties located at the extreme ends of the political 
spectrum are more likely to benefit electorally from the dynamics of the No vote in the 
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referendum. This is particularly true of the Front national whose electorate’s anti-EU feelings 
form part of a specific attitudinal syndrome that differentiate Le Pen’s voters from those of 
both the mainstream left and right (Andersen & Evans, 2003; Grunberg & Schweisguth, 
2003). In the 2002 presidential election, the European cleavage already resurfaced in an 
extreme right guise, with the Le Pen vote reaching peaks among those who had vigorously 
opposed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Ivaldi, 2002). In 2005, the far right supporters were 
the only ones to clearly reject not only the ECT but also the whole process of European 
integration, with 54 per cent of Le Pen’s voters considering France’s EU membership to be a 
‘bad thing’ (Flash Eurobarometer 171, 30/31 May 2005). The long-standing and indeed 
problematic question of ageing Le Pen’s succession aside, the French far right will probably 
be in the best position to capitalise on the rejection of the ECT in forthcoming national 
ballots. 
 
Notwithstanding the strong polarisation of attitudes towards Europe at both party and 
electoral levels, European issues tend generally to be absorbed and incorporated into the 
political parties’ national agenda if not simply carefully avoided by mainstream actors when 
the time comes to appeal to voters in first-order ballots. To a large extent, this was due in the 
past to the very nature of the European issue and its dramatic impact in terms of increasing 
party factionalism, but most of all to the verticality of the pro / anti-EU cleavage which was 
essentially organised along the lines of national sovereignty versus supranationalism. In 2005, 
the opposition over Europe was more closely articulated with the classic left-right axis of 
electoral competition over traditional social and economic issues and should therefore be 
more easily transposable a priori into the domestic arena. Given the outcome of the 
referendum, however, the pro-EU position taken by mainstream actors of the left and right 
might prove untenable if not simply politically suicidal and only the competitors of the No 
camp will benefit from re-activating the issue in the 2007 national campaign. 
 
At international level, the decisive French vote on the European Constitution –immediately 
followed by that of the Dutch– did put a serious halt to the process of reforming European 
institutions. Britain’s subsequent decision to shelve plans to hold a national referendum 
together with the acknowledgment by Prime Minister Tony Blair of the Treaty’s demise 
further cast the fate of the moribund European Charter’s into doubts while opening a period of 
profound uncertainty within the Union. Obituaries might be premature but the decision by the 
Brussels EU summit on 16-17 June 2005 to have a pause in the ratification process was a 
clear indication of its deceleration and increasing fears of ‘contamination’ to other member 
states who have yet to pronounce their decision on the constitutional Treaty. The feeling that 
the outcome of the French and Dutch referenda had pushed the Union into paralysis was 
reinforced by the strong Franco-British disagreement about the 2007-2013 EU budget, 
controversy over the British rebate and growing uncertainty concerning the future of farm 
subsidies long secured by French farmers through CAP measures. On 29 May 2005, the 
majority of French voters sacrificed real-Europa on the altar of a new utopian project for a 
more social protectionist EU: the opening of rather difficult negotiations with other member 
States over contradictory national self-interests under increasing pressure from Europe’s trade 
competitors might soon lead to this most cherished social dimension being overshadowed by 
those very economic logics that formed the core of France’s decision to reject the European 
constitutional Treaty. 
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